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Clean Air Act Dynamism and Disappointments: 
Lessons for Climate Legislation to Prompt Innovation 
and Discourage Inertia 
William W. Buzbee  
INTRODUCTION 
All successful regulatory schemes must balance clarity and 
stability with the need for flexibility and regulatory learning. Room 
for regulatory and private sector innovation is critical. However, 
regulatory challenges often encounter not restless regulators and 
private actors brimming over with innovation ideas and seeking 
regulatory improvements, but government and private sector inertia 
and resistance to change.
1
 Both regulators and the targets of 
regulation may invest in initial regulatory choices and, regardless of 
the efficacy of such choices, resist investment in change due to 
limited resources, waste of sunk costs, fear of uncertain results, status 
quo bias, or laziness. Antiquated and often more lax requirements 
imposed on established polluters can provide an economic advantage 
to existing polluters and serve as a barrier to entry by new 
competitors. Even entities such as public interest nonprofits, despite 
their ostensible watchdog roles, may fail to reexamine old regulatory 
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 1. For discussion of the inertia risks and related motivations summarized in this 
paragraph, see discussion infra Part I. 
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choices, due to limited resources or a focus on newer challenges in 
the public limelight.  
The Clean Air Act (―CAA‖) is a behemoth of a law, with 
hundreds of pages and numerous titles reflecting decades of 
amendments.
2
 The law, through its many complex and interacting 
provisions, seeks to address the myriad sources of air pollution with a 
concomitant complex array of potential regulators and responsive 
regulatory strategies. Versions of the CAA preceding the substantial 
1990 amendments were criticized by some as unduly rigid command 
and control regulations.
3
 Some of those criticisms undoubtedly were 
accurate, but key provisions of the CAA actually offer diverse and 
arguably laudable strategies that balance desire for stability and 
knowable legal obligations with the need for innovation, change, and 
antidotes to regulatory inertia. Effective, innovative provisions, as 
well as those proven to be flawed, provide lessons for other 
environmental legislation, especially climate change legislation.  
It appears likely that any federal climate change legislation will 
utilize a cap-and-trade scheme.
4
 A cap-and-trade scheme limits 
aggregate emissions of greenhouse gases (―GHGs‖) on an annual 
declining basis, distributes emission allowances, and permits trading 
of emission allowances and offset credits.
5
 Such a market-based 
 
 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7700 (2006). 
 3. The most sustained and focused criticism of the law appeared in several 1980s works 
by Bruce Ackerman, William Hassler, and Richard Stewart. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & 
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR, OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A 
MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD 
BE DONE ABOUT IT 11 (1981) (claiming that the CAA forced the EPA to specify both the ends 
and means of achieving clean air objectives in new power plants); Bruce A. Ackerman & 
William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 
1477–78 (1980) (suggesting that because only the ―best system‖ is acceptable in new plants, the 
new plants must initiate one specific ―best system‖ rather than considering local conditions); 
Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. 
L. REV. 1333, 1341 (1985) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law] 
(claiming that a best available technology standard ―command[s] specific amounts of cleanup 
from specific polluters‖). Their criticisms provoked responsive critiques of the feasibility of 
their analysis and prescriptions. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory 
Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and „Fine-Tuning‟ Regulatory Reforms, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1268–71 (1985) [hereinafter Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory 
Efficiency] (explaining the advantages of uniform standards over more flexible regulatory 
strategies). 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See U.S. EPA Cap and Trade, Cap and Trade Markets, http://www.epa.gov/captrade/ 
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regime likely would be coupled with numerous mandates and 
incentives structured to produce a lower polluting and more energy- 
efficient economy. Such a bill would offer some promise of 
innovation and checking of inertial forces, but if the bill lacks key 
strategies or utilizes strategies similar to those that have proven to be 
ineffective, it may lose key pro-innovation and inertia-fighting 
factors. Most notably, ambivalence toward state roles and 
technology-forcing provisions may result in climate legislation that 
omits strategies and structures that have proven effective in the 
CAA.
6
 This Article reviews these key strategies offering CAA 
dynamism and reflects on the lessons these strategies provide for 
climate change legislation. 
I. THE RATIONALES FOR BALANCING LEGAL STABILITY WITH 
LATITUDE FOR CHANGE AND DESTABILIZATION MECHANISMS TO 
CHECK INERTIA 
If an environmental law—or any law—is perpetually in flux, it 
likely will frustrate both private and public goals. Legal stability and 
knowable legal obligations are essential.
7
 However, regulation could 
also create the opposite problem, where legal strategies and resulting 
obligations are set and then seldom revisited, even if innovations and 
improved results are possible. Before turning to CAA provisions that 
seek to balance these goals and concerns, this Part discusses the 
stability-innovation tradeoff. 
From the perspective of those regulated, a stable regulatory 
environment is critical for investment decisions and market success. 
An industrial polluter, homebuilder, or virtually any target of 
regulation, will find it difficult to succeed if it confronts an unduly 
confusing body of regulation or regulatory obligations that are in 
constant flux.
8
 With too many changes or confusing law,
9
 it will take 
 
allowance-trading.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
 6. See infra Part III.B. 
 7. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38–39 (rev. ed. 1969). 
 8. See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of 
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2429–40 
(1995) (noting the complex and confusing nature of environmental regulation); J.B. Ruhl & 
James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the 
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large investments in regulatory compliance and related research to 
operate, effectively drawing limited resources from productivity-
enhancing investments.
10
 Some regulatory changes may prompt 
investments that improve both productivity and reduce pollution or 
other environmental harms, but the costs of determining compliance 
obligations generally will be transaction costs that do not further 
economic or environmental goals.
11
 If another jurisdiction offers a 
more stable and knowable regulatory environment, competitors 
operating in that other jurisdiction will have a competitive advantage 
with respect to that variable.
12
  
On the other hand, rigidified laws, regulations, and permit 
obligations can lead to poor environmental performance and 
economic harms, even if a particular polluter may benefit from such 
obligations. Rigid regulation can harm industry by precluding 
polluters from finding cost-effective means to attain regulatory ends 
while meeting business goals.
13
 But few laws dictate more than levels 
of performance; technological mandates are rare and disfavored.
14
 
Much regulatory inertia flows from agencies that fail to meet 
implementation deadlines, fail to find better means to regulatory 
 
Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 761 n.12 (2003) (describing the excessive amount of 
environmental regulation as ―regulatory accretion‖). 
 9. See Lazarus, supra note 8; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 8. 
 10. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 266 n.65 (1984). 
 11. Although lawyers and consultants may applaud and recognize so-called transaction 
costs that support their livelihood and may productively enhance regulatory and transactional 
outcomes, much of their work is not likely to enhance productivity. See id. at 241–42, 250–55 
(suggesting that lawyers often do not serve in constructive or productive roles but arguing that 
lawyers can act to address information failures and move a deal to a more appropriate price). 
 12. Cf. Robert B. Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of 
Federalism for Corporate Governance, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255, 284 (2009) (―[S]tates that 
enact indeterminate rules or fail to innovate efficiently can be expected to suffer a loss in 
incorporations. . . . States that align their rules with the needs of relevant corporations, and their 
franchise taxes with the value of services they provide, by contrast, can be expected to gain 
business.‖); Jerry Ellig & Houman B. Shadab, Talking the Talk, or Walking the Walk? 
Outcome-based Regulation of Transnational Investment, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 265, 
324–29 (2009) (noting that countries with strong legal systems attract more investors). 
 13. See Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and 
the Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1714 (2008).  
 14. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h) (2006). 
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ends, or do not take enforcement action against noncompliance.
15
 
Some of this inertia is due to overly optimistic and aspirational laws 
that are not accompanied by adequate monetary resources or realistic 
deadlines and regulatory burdens.
16
 Agencies may also be dilatory 
and fail to meet requirements due to bureaucratic laziness. Many 
agencies seek budgetary expansions and possibly an enlarged 
regulatory turf, but those sometimes observed tendencies do not 
necessarily lead to self-critical and active regulators.
17
 For reasons 
amplified below, agencies will sometimes fear cracking down on 
regulatory targets, alienating executive officials or legislators 
controlling their budgets, or upsetting established modes of action. 
Targets of regulation often are happy with such inertia and resist 
change, especially change that might result in more stringent 
regulatory requirements.
18
 In ways that may be harmful to both 
business and environmental goals, targets may avoid information that 
might trigger more stringent regulatory controls. Industry will seek to 
influence regulators and legislators, sometimes capturing ostensible 
regulatory agencies and thereby creating an unduly lax agency 
sympathetic to those regulated.
19
 Even if agencies are not literally 
captured, they are dependent on industry for information and will 
frequently interact with their ostensible targets.
20
 This may result in 
decisions that inordinately reflect industry preferences. 
Countervailing citizen groups or nonprofits sometimes counter 
industry views and preferences, but often are outmatched. 
 
 15. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
233, 277–83 (1990) (discussing how Congress declares goals without commensurate funding 
and adequate enforcement mechanisms, leading to implementation failures such as EPA‘s delay 
in regulating hazardous air pollutants). 
 16. See id. at 283. 
 17. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of 
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 40–41, 44–48 (2003) [hereinafter Buzbee, Recognizing 
the Regulatory Commons] (noting the hypothesis that regulators seek budgeting and turf 
expansions for personal gain but developing the regulatory commons hypothesis to explain why 
inaction and risk aversion may be found). 
 18. See id. at 34–36.  
 19. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1669, 1684–87 (1975); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 421, 448–49 (1987) (discussing the phenomenon of ―capture‖). 
 20. See Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Making Sense of Information for 
Environmental Protection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1352 (2008). 
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Asymmetrically borne benefits and risks will virtually ensure 
industry engagement, but citizen beneficiaries of regulatory 
protection may not act.
21
 Citizens typically lack the monetary 
resources of industry participants and bear a small percentage of 
resulting harm of unregulated activity or benefits of regulatory 
action.
22
 These asymmetrically borne interests skew monetary 
incentives against citizen participation in the regulatory process, 
resulting in greater relative influence of stakeholders in industry or 
government. As economist Mancur Olson observed, this disparity in 
resources, coupled with the concentrated interest of small numbers of 
regulatory targets, systematically advantages industry or the 
government and disadvantages beneficiaries of regulation.
23
 
Regulatory regimes that have become encrusted with complexities 
and quirks, especially provisions tailored to production modes of 
dominant but possibly antiquated industry practices, provide 
advantages to existing industry participants and discourage new 
market entrants.
24
 New entrants must master legal intricacies and 
might have to tailor their production methods in inefficient ways to 
meet the law in settings where regulation assumes older modes of 
production. Even where regulatory obligations may be simple to 
discern, many bodies of regulation grandfather in existing sources of 
harm.
25
 Grandfathering subjects existing sources to more lax 
requirements than those faced by new pollution sources and often 
grants them an economic advantage, such as by giving existing 
 
 21. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in 
Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1413–20 (2008) [hereinafter Karkkainen, 
Bottlenecks and Baselines] (discussing information asymmetries among industry, agencies, and 
citizen stakeholders and reasons this leads to skewed or imprudent regulation). 
 22. Cf. id. at 1415. 
 23. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 143–45 (1965). 
 24. For a discussion of barriers to entry, see Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and 
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 572 (2001) 
(citing Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, The Choice of 
Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 348–51 
(1988)). 
 25. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental 
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1678 
(2007) (exploring rationales for and against grandfathering strategies); see also Jonathan Masur 
& Jonathan R. Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010) (discussing grandfathering and other forms of transition relief and 
developing political and economic explanations for the prevalence of such relief).  
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sources freely distributed pollution allowances.
26
 In contrast, new 
market entrants must purchase allowances in the market.
27
 Such 
strategies reward sources of past harm and pollution and create 
incentives for such sources not to adjust to legal and political 
change.
28
 Older, accreted, and complex bodies of law thus can serve 
as barriers to new entrants. These barriers, in turn, protect old, 
inefficient, and often high-pollution production methods and deny 
consumers the benefit of greater market competition.  
Policymakers also often have an incentive to maintain the status 
quo, which in turn is influenced by regulatory stakeholders‘ 
preferences. This status quo bias is rooted in several related 
psychological tendencies and political-economic incentives that 
impede change.
29
 A general tendency of people to value what they 
have and resist change is a robust tenet of behavioral economics.
30
 
Furthermore, politicians and regulators who invest in a regulatory 
framework will resist throwing away related investments. Complying 
industry will be especially resistant to change requiring yet more 
investments in modified production methods to meet new 
requirements. Hence, even a regulatory approach viewed by 
lawmakers and industry as misguided may be preferred to an 
improved standard due to general resistance to change and associated 
costs. 
A further phenomenon creates a heightened risk of rigidified legal 
obligations. Agencies operating in the environmental arena tend to 
address risks and resulting harms that involve scientific and 
technological uncertainties and regulatory strategies of untested 
efficacy. Moreover, agency regulatory choices often prove 
 
 26. See Nash & Revesz, supra note 25, at 1708.  
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 7651d(b)–(e). 
 28. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 509, 584–86 (1986). 
 29. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1594–95 (2007) [hereinafter Buzbee, 
Asymmetrical Regulation]; William W. Buzbee, Interaction‟s Promise: Preemption Policy 
Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 156 & n.39, 160–61 
(2007) [hereinafter Buzbee, Interaction‟s Promise]; Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems 
and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
1153, 1179–80, 1185–96; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 300 (2000).  
 30. See Rachlinski, supra note 29, at 307–08. 
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disappointing to both targets and beneficiaries of regulation. 
Therefore, most major regulatory actions, especially rulemakings, are 
followed by judicial challenges. Due to often intrusive ―hard look 
review‖ of agency action, scholars have long observed a problem of 
regulatory ―ossification‖ as agencies shy away from the costs, delays, 
and expenditures associated with regulatory litigation.
31
 Judicially 
induced ossification is compounded by increasingly burdensome 
analytical requirements in executive orders or statutes mandating that 
agencies examine at least cost-benefit implications, effects on small 
business, paperwork burdens, and federalism impacts.
32
 
Unsurprisingly, many regulatory deadlines for an agency to update its 
performance standards and other environmental requirements go 
unmet. A missed deadline can trigger litigation from regulatory 
beneficiaries or vendors of services or goods that would benefit from 
updated regulation.
33
 Thus, avoidance of an increased workload, 
coupled with old-fashioned risk aversion, will lead regulators to resist 
regulatory reexamination and change.
34
  
Many environmental laws also require polluters‘ permits to be 
updated at regular intervals, usually with a prohibition on 
―backsliding‖; renewed permits usually cannot be more lax than an 
earlier permit.
35
 Permitting proceedings can be time-consuming and 
costly for regulators and the polluting industry, and are similarly 
costly for any participating citizens.
36
 When an opposing citizen 
 
 31. For perhaps the most prominent article regarding the ossification hypothesis, see 
Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1385, 1419–20 (1992). See also Blais & Wagner, supra note 13, at 1704–29 (discussing 
regulation ossification and related scholarship). 
 32. For a summary of these analytical requirements imposed by laws and executive 
orders, see ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 
210–17 (5th ed. 2007). 
 33. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(describing case in which manufacturers of waste treatment equipment sued the EPA for not 
implementing stringent regulation). 
 34. See Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 29, at 1592–95, 1608–09 
(discussing risk aversion and its implications for regulatory resistance to change in an article 
exploring implications of preemption choices). 
 35. Cf. Blais & Wagner, supra note 13, at 1717–19 (discussing the revised requirements 
of the Clean Water Act (―CWA‖) and CAA).  
 36. Graham Zorn, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Its Routine Maintenance 
Exception: The Definition of Routine, Past, Present, and Future, 33 VT. L. REV. 783, 797–98 
(2009).  
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group participates in permit proceedings, any resulting permit change 
can trigger subsequent litigation. The resulting time and monetary 
expenses can dissuade permittees and regulators from updating 
permits.
37
 In settings where no beneficiary group is monitoring a 
polluter‘s permit compliance or permit renewal obligations, old 
permits may remain in effect long after they should be revised; 
neither the government nor the polluter will seek change.  
The use of cooperative federalism‘s ―delegated program‖ 
structures can provide numerous regulatory benefits. However, such 
structures can also contribute to permit laxity and failures to update 
permit obligations. Many states assume initial responsibility for 
implementation and enforcement of federal law, subject to varying 
degrees of federal oversight and overfiling risks.
38
 States sometimes 
innovate and regulate with greater rigor than the federal 
government.
39
 More often, however, the opposite is true. State and 
local governments are more dependent on local employment and tax 
revenues than federal actors, resulting in a frequent bias in favor of 
industry and against regulatory rigor.
40
 States often will miss 
 
 37. See Blais & Wagner, supra note 13, at 1720–28 (noting the EPA‘s failure to revise 
standards to reflect technological innovation and diffusion); Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: 
A Strategy to Save America‟s Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L. REV. 358, 390 (1988) (discussing the 
EPA‘s failure to review permits as required by the CWA). 
 38. See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 991–1001 (discussing and providing 
materials regarding overfiling). 
 39. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 108, 119–21, 123 (2005) [hereinafter Buzbee, Contextual Environmental 
Federalism] (exploring settings in which states and the federal government have advanced 
regulatory protections and how each have learned from the other‘s innovations); Kirsten Engel, 
State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments 
to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say about Federalism and Environmental 
Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1021–25 (2006) [hereinafter Engel, State and Local Climate 
Change Initiatives]; Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation, supra note 24, at 640 
(analyzing dynamics of environmental regulation and finding more evidence of state leadership 
and innovation than typically found by other legal scholars); Richard B. Stewart, States and 
Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 681, 683–88 (2008) [hereinafter Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate 
Regulation]. 
 40. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and 
Is It “to the Bottom”? 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274–78 (1997); Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River 
Runs through It (the Failure of Enforcement in the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 1, 1–6 (1997) (discussing the ―race to the bottom‖ phenomenon). But see Richard L. 
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to–the-Bottom” Rationale 
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1211–12 (1992) (arguing that 
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statutory deadlines and delegated program obligations. They often 
show enforcement laxity, offering minimal or nonexistent penalties 
for regulatory violations.
41
 In addition, states sometimes will 
cooperate with industry to take lax enforcement actions in an effort to 
subvert federal or citizen enforcement actions against a polluter 
violating the law. Whether through collusive secret administrative 
consent orders or minimal state penalties accompanied by interim 
relief from permit limitations, state and local actors can require 
environmental performance far below federal requirements.
42
 Here, 
too, the results are static environmental requirements and little or no 
environmental improvement. 
Most statutorily required permit limitations are not literally 
―command and control‖ in the sense of mandating a technology. 
Instead, most statutes, regulations, and permits examine technological 
capacity and countervailing costs or feasibility factors, then utilize 
performance standards that set a numerical pollution limit.
43
 Such 
regulatory and permit limitations initially push in the direction of 
more stringent pollution requirements, but they also create an inertia 
risk. Under outdated, technology-based performance standards, 
polluters have little or no incentive to improve their performance 
beyond what those standards require.
44
 Additional pollution-reduction 
investments merely create costs without providing regulatory or 
market reward unless the polluter can claim credit for being ―green‖ 
or achieving more sustainable operations. Others may find 
 
state competition can lead to an ―efficient allocation of industrial activity‖). For a 
comprehensive investigative journalistic assessment of enforcement failures under the CWA, 
with a substantial focus on state-level laxity that often is unchecked by the federal government, 
see Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Are Neglected, at a Cost in Suffering, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
13, 2009, at A1. 
 41. See Duhigg, supra note 40; Flatt, supra note 40, at 5. 
 42. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, The Story of Laidlaw: Standing and Citizen 
Enforcement, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 201, 210–11 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. 
Houck eds., 2005) [hereinafter Buzbee, Story of Laidlaw]. 
 43. See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 21, 27–32 (2001); see also Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1505–
10 (2009) (discussing best available technology standards under CWA and cost-benefit analysis 
used by EPA, concluding that the EPA‘s reliance on cost-benefit analysis was permissible). 
 44. See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, supra note 3, at 1336 
(noting that best available technology performance standards do not ―provide strong incentives 
for the development of new, environmentally superior strategies, and may actually discourage 
their development‖). 
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compliance costly and difficult, reducing profits or forcing a business 
closure. Thus, even appropriately up-to-date regulatory and permit 
standards do not create incentives for anyone to do better. Other than 
with regard to their own permit compliance, there will be limited 
reward for investment in research to discover more effective 
environmental regulation or pollution control technologies. Lack of 
reward for innovation is especially likely if companies are partially 
insulated from competition by regulatory frameworks or other 
deviations from an ideal, competitive market.  
Tradable permits can serve as a valuable antidote to complacency 
resulting from command-and-control or performance-based 
standards. Tradable permits also reward innovation, a realization that 
spurred enactment of several CAA titles utilizing variants on 
pollution trading. In fact, the CAA contains numerous provisions that 
serve as antidotes to laxity and inertia, while still offering polluters 
ascertainable legal obligations and nudging them in the direction of 
cleaner air. The next Part analyzes those provisions, contrasting 
effective provisions with several that have proven dysfunctional. 
II. CLEAN AIR ACT INNOVATION AND INERTIA LESSONS  
Despite occasional condemnation of the CAA as a law mostly 
based on unduly rigid command-and-control regulation,
45
 the Act 
actually contains numerous provisions that create powerful incentives 
and structures that reduce inertia risks and can prompt innovation 
resulting in environmental improvements. Other provisions, in 
contrast, are recipes for dysfunction and outdated regulatory 
requirements. 
A. Federalism Structures 
A large structural feature of the CAA that encourages innovation 
and regulatory learning is use of cooperative federalism ―delegated 
program‖ structures.46 These delegated program structures allow 
 
 45. See sources cited supra note 3. 
 46. William W. Buzbee, Federal Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federalism‟s 
Institutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF 
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states to take over federal implementation and enforcement roles.
47
 
The delegation is not complete; federal oversight precedes most 
delegations and remains post-delegation in the form of oversight of 
implementation and enforcement.
48
 Such delegations allow a degree 
of local tailoring of air pollution goals and means by which to 
comply, thereby providing potential lessons for other states and 
federal regulators.
49
 Relatedly, the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (―EPA‖) is obligated to keep a clearinghouse of 
information regarding pollution risks, goals, and reduction 
strategies.
50
 That clearinghouse is supported by retention of a 
multiplicity of actors as players in the CAA implementation and 
enforcement process.
51
  
Perhaps more important to latitude and incentives for innovation 
are the CAA‘s savings clauses and floor preemption strategies.52 
These linked strategies preserve state and local governments‘ option 
to impose more stringent pollution reduction obligations, thus 
allowing for additional diversity of regulatory approaches. Floor 
preemption strategies preclude state regulation that is more lax than 
the federal norm but allow more protective state and local measures. 
Such regulatory floors and savings clauses thus allow state and local 
governments to enact legislation or regulations that force polluters to 
reduce pollution more than federal standards require.
53
 Many states 
 
FEDERALISM‘S CORE QUESTION 98, 101 & n.6 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) [hereinafter 
PREEMPTION CHOICE]. 
 47. See id. at 101. 
 48. William W. Buzbee, The Menu of Preemption Choice Variables, in PREEMPTION 
CHOICE, supra note 46, at 301.  
 49. See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Environmental Federalism, in 
PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 46, at 277, 293–95 (discussing the merits of overlapping 
federal and state jurisdiction in environmental legislation). 
 50. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7403, 7408(h) (2006). 
 51. As discussed below and evident throughout the CAA, EPA, states, industry, citizens, 
and other interested entities are provided innumerable opportunities to participate in the 
implementation and enforcement process. See infra notes 52–70 and accompanying text. 
 52. In addition to numerous provisions providing states with authority and opportunities 
to influence the implementation of CAA goals, the CAA contains a sweeping savings clause 
that preserves states‘ ability to be more protective. See 42 U.S.C. § 7416. Opening provisions 
specifically note past and current state roles. Id. §§ 7401–7402. 
 53. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 29, at 1567–68; Buzbee, Interaction‟s 
Promise, supra note 29, at 157, 162; Buzbee, Federal Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of 
Federalism‟s Institutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 46, at 98, 106–10. 
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have no interest in going beyond federal levels of protection and have 
enacted laws precluding such action.
54
 Other states, especially 
California, have in various areas of the law imposed more stringent 
standards than federal laws require.
55
 Sometimes these innovations 
appear to spring from the creativity and culture or needs and 
opportunities of the particular state. In other instances, they arise in 
the context of state improvements to federal regulatory schemes.
56
 
Each such innovation and more protective law or regulation serves to 
educate federal regulators, regulators in other states and 
municipalities, and citizens about creative regulation and achievable 
environmental results.
57
 A benefit of federalism and latitude for state 
innovation and greater stringency is that even if most states move in 
lockstep and are inclined to laxity, one state innovator can offer 
lessons to all. Other jurisdictions may learn from innovative states‘ 
successes and failures since governmental innovations will, by their 
nature, be publicly known initiatives or requirements.
58
  
The CAA does contain one preemptive provision that sets uniform 
federal emissions standards on new automobiles and precludes other 
units of government from issuing their own tailpipe requirements.
59
 
Even that provision, however, gives California the right to impose its 
own separate, more stringent motor vehicle emission limitation upon 
federal approval of a waiver application, thus promoting 
experimentation and innovation.
60
 If approved, other states seeking to 
 
 54. Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental 
Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretative 
Problems, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373, 1376–86 (1995). 
 55. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 56. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 49, at 296–99. 
 57. See Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 39, at 123; Ann E. 
Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1139 (2009) 
(observing mutual interactive learning between federal and state regulators, with a particular 
focus on the federal law‘s influence on California‘s progressive regulations); Buzbee, Federal 
Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federalism‟s Institutional Diversity, supra note 46, at 110 
(noting ongoing incentives for state actors to innovate); Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate 
Competition, supra note 40, at 1228 (providing examples of more stringent state legislation). 
But see Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting, supra note 40, at 316 (finding empirical 
and theoretical support for state tendency to engage in races to the regulatory bottom). 
 58. See Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 17, at 33 (noting that 
regulators cannot patent their innovations). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521(a), 7543(a) (2006). 
 60. See id. § 7507. 
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reduce their pollution levels have the option of adopting the 
California motor vehicle standards.
61
 This provision creates a 
presumptive uniform federal requirement, but it also avoids a federal 
regulatory monopoly and potential laxity by giving California and 
piggybacking states the ability to impose more stringent 
requirements. 
The right of state or local enforcers, whether agencies or state 
attorneys general, to investigate wrongdoing further serves as an 
antidote to complacency that can be fostered during periods of federal 
laxity.
62
 Similarly, citizen suit provisions in the CAA and other 
environmental laws place citizens in a critically important role.
63
 If 
the federal or state government misses deadlines or issues regulations 
or permits that are unjustifiably lax, citizens can institute litigation.
64
 
States also may utilize this provision. Such suits thus serve to counter 
potential regulatory capture.
65
 Standing and pleading hurdles created 
by case law can serve as a barrier to some such suits, but with 
effective legal representation, most citizen suits can overcome 
standing barriers. The CAA also creates monetary incentives for 
bringing sound citizen litigation by allowing courts to award attorney 
fees and costs to substantially prevailing parties.
66
 The CAA imposes 
numerous deadlines on regulators that provide citizens an opportunity 
to commence litigation alleging that federal agencies or regulatory 
actors have violated discrete, nondiscretionary duties.
67
 Thus, the 
combination of citizen suit provisions and deadlines allows citizens 
in most instances to surmount standing and administrative law-based 
hurdles such as those articulated in standing jurisprudence and 
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.
68
  
 
 61. Id. § 7543. 
 62. Trevor W. Morrison, The State Attorney General and Preemption, in PREEMPTION 
CHOICE, supra note 46, at 81, 84–87 (emphasizing the role of state attorneys general). 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 
 64. See id.; Buzbee, Story of Laidlaw, supra note 42, at 202–03. 
 65. Buzbee, Story of Laidlaw, supra note 42, at 202–03 (explaining that citizen suits fill in 
gaps when government actors fail to enforce the law). 
 66. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d). 
 67. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 
 68. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (holding that a 
claim under the Administrative Procedure Act to compel agency action can only be upheld 
when the agency failed to take a discrete and required action); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185–88 (2000) (deferring to legislative judgment in 
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Of particular importance to fostering innovation and creating 
incentives for reduced pollution is the preservation of common law 
regimes through savings clauses and linked floor preemption. Even if 
all regulators and enforcers lean toward laxity, harms resulting from 
pollution or other despoiling of the environment can give rise to 
nuisance or toxic tort actions. The possibility of injunctive relief and 
damage awards, sometimes including punitive damages, will create 
ongoing incentives for plaintiffs to consider commencing litigation 
and for industry to reduce risks and harm. Tort and nuisance litigators 
can learn from regulatory databases and actions, but regulators and 
legislators also learn from information elicited by common law 
actions.
69
 Mere compliance with regulatory requirements and permits 
does not insulate polluters from common law liabilities.
70
  
These various federalism-related provisions have the additional 
benefit of largely eliminating costly and time-consuming industry 
challenges to state regulatory and common law actions on grounds 
that they pose a conflict and are preempted by federal law. Stark, 
unavoidable conflicts remain a possibility and could give rise to 
preemption claims, but most preemption claims relying on the CAA 
are likely to be losers. In contrast, the motor vehicle provision, with 
its limited preemptive reach, has spawned substantial litigation 
challenging both California‘s motor vehicle regulations and the 
efforts of piggybacking states to adopt stringent regulations such as 
fleet-based emission limitations.
71
 The most recent judicial and 
 
citizen-suit provisions in upholding plaintiffs‘ standing); Buzbee, Story of Laidlaw, supra note 
42, at 214–30 (discussing historical standing obstacles and the Supreme Court‘s deference to 
legislative judgments in Laidlaw). 
 69. See Thomas O. McGarity, The Regulation-Common Law Feedback Loop in 
Nonpreemptive Regimes, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 46, at 235, 235–56 [hereinafter 
McGarity, The Regulation-Common Law Feedback Loop in Nonpreemptive Regimes] 
(discussing mutual learning facilitated through coexistence of common law and regulatory 
regimes addressing similar risks). 
 70. See Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory 
State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 564–65, 579–84, 600 (2007) (arguing for increased emphasis on 
state common law); see also McGarity, The Regulation-Common Law Feedback Loop in 
Nonpreemptive Regimes, supra note 69, at 235; cf. David C. Vladeck, Preemption and 
Regulatory Failure Risks, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 46, at 54, 56–57 (claiming that 
common law tort claims increasingly are being preempted by federal regulation and articulating 
reasons to preserve common law regimes despite overlapping regulation). 
 71. See JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS, CALIFORNIA‘S WAIVER REQUEST TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE 
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regulatory skirmishing resulted in EPA revisiting and reversing an 
earlier denial of a waiver for California to regulate GHGs from motor 
vehicles.
72
 
B. New Source Review and Nonattainment Permitting 
The CAA‘s approaches to stationary source permitting and 
emission limitations set by regulation provide lessons both about 
effective and dysfunctional regulatory design. The Act utilizes a wide 
range of strategies, ranging from top-down, agency-set uniform 
emission limitations under section 111 ―standards of performance‖ 
for new sources
73
 to tradable pollution rights.
74
 Tradable pollution 
rights are one of the earliest precedents for climate change cap-and-
trade schemes. Perhaps underappreciated are criteria applicable to 
permit-set emission limitations that create a ratchet favoring stringent 
and innovative regulation. They function as ―adjudicatory triggers‖ 
for stakeholders to assess the most stringent legal requirements or 
best performers in setting permit requirements.
75
 
Section 111 requires EPA to set emissions limitations for major 
stationary sources of pollution that cause or contribute significantly 
to air pollution ―which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare.‖76 The law requires emissions limitations for 
 
CLEAN AIR ACT 3–5, 12–14 (2007), http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Oct/RL34099. 
pdf; Rachel L. Chanin, California‟s Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 699, 702 (2003) (reviewing litigation engendered 
under these provisions as of 2003); Gale Lee Rubrecht, EPA Region 3, AIR QUALITY 
COMMITTEE NEWSL. (AM. BAR ASS‘N SEC. OF ENV‘T., ENERGY, & RES., Chicago, Ill.), Aug. 
2007, at 13–14, 16 (discussing litigation initiated by the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers 
against the State of Vermont following Vermont‘s adoption of California motor vehicle 
regulations). 
 72. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision 
Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California‘s 2009 and Subsequent Model 
Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 
8, 2009).  
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006). 
 74. Id. § 7412(g)(1). 
 75. An ―adjudicatory trigger‖ framework is a distinctive regulatory design choice offering 
several advantages over one-time, high-stakes rulemakings. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, 
Adjudicatory Triggers of Enhanced Ambient Environment Information, 83 IND. L.J. 583, 594 
(2008) [hereinafter Buzbee, Adjudicatory Triggers of Enhanced Ambient Environment 
Information]. 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
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categories of polluters to reflect the ―best system of emission 
reduction,‖ subject to consideration of countervailing cost and other 
energy, health, and environmental impacts.
77
 These requirements are 
set by EPA through a notice-and-comment process.
78
 Such limitations 
must account for variables such as sizes, ages, and modes of 
production. Because of information challenges and clashes between 
industry and environmentalists over regulatory stringency, these 
section 111 rulemaking proceedings are slow and often followed by 
litigation. Due to the burdens of such proceedings and the risk that 
revisions would lead to more stringent control requirements, section 
111 regulations are seldom revisited or kept up to date to reflect 
changing pollution control capacities.
79
 Regulation promulgation 
includes broad participation rights. Initial deadlines were set by 
statute, but only limited statutory triggers exist for regulatory 
revision.
80
 If a governor or state seeks revision in light of new 
technological developments, EPA must respond. EPA is otherwise 
under little pressure to revisit standards of performance once they are 
set. This trend results in antiquated standards that seldom are 
revisited.
81
 Section 111(h) makes clear that normal requirements are 
to be emission limitations, with technological mandates being the 
exception.
82
 Apart from that normal preservation of latitude for 
industry choice of compliance methods, section 111 is a recipe for 
regulatory delay and inertia. 
Similarly, the 1990 Amendments set technology-based standards 
for hazardous air pollutants, relying on agency leadership and a 
notice-and-comment process.
83
 This provision also has been plagued 
by delays, although fewer than occurred under its pre-1990 version.
84
 
 
 77. Id. § 7411(a)(1). 
 78. See id. § 7411(g)(6), (h)(3), (j)(1)(A). 
 79. See Blais & Wagner, supra note 13, at 1720–25, 1735–36 (finding significant failures 
to revise antiquated standards and highlighting that there is no mechanism for assimilating 
technological innovations into industry-wide regulatory standards). 
 80. See id. at 1725–26.  
 81. See id. at 1726.  
 82. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h).  
 83. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR POLLUTION: STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
AND ISSUES OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 34 (2000) [hereinafter GAO, AIR 
POLLUTION].  
 84. See id. at 34–35 (reporting nearly two hundred missed statutory deadlines by EPA); 
see also infra pp. 65–68 (further discussing § 112‘s track record both before and after the 1990 
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Most other CAA provisions relating to stationary sources use a 
very different regulatory modality. Any possibly existing section 111 
standards serve as a floor in setting permit limitations, but other 
provisions rely not on a regulatory notice-and-comment model but on 
permit-specific adjudication.
85
 Permit-specific adjudication is subject 
to governmental and citizen input, under statutorily set criteria or 
through an early variant on pollution trading in the State 
Implementation Plan (―SIP‖) nonattainment offset scheme.86 These 
strategies to derive pollution-control requirements thus avoid agency 
delay ―ruts‖ that result in stale regulatory requirements.87 Such 
permit-by-permit scrutiny is far less vulnerable to reliance on 
outdated standards and information.
88
 For environmental success, 
such scrutiny depends on the existence of active, knowledgeable 
environmental advocates other than permitting authorities and the 
polluter.
89
  
Provisions applicable to new stationary sources of pollution in 
nonattainment areas are perhaps most innovative and favorable to 
regulatory dynamism.
90
 If a jurisdiction does not meet federal 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (―NAAQS‖) for a criteria 
pollutant, potential new sources of pollution are subjected to 
 
CAA amendments). 
 85. See GAO, AIR POLLUTION, supra note 83, at 11.  
 86. Buzbee, Adjudicatory Triggers of Enhanced Ambient Environment Information, supra 
note 75, at 594–95 (explaining that a new source requires offsets from existing sources and that 
a permit grant under the CAA requires the agency to receive comment about environmental 
impacts); Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean 
Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 238–39 (1999) (referring to the permit requirements for 
new and stationary sources). 
 87. See Blais & Wagner, supra note 13, at 1727–28 (developing the concept of 
rulemaking ruts and analyzing why they are prevalent). 
 88. See infra p. 67.  
 89. See infra pp. 53–58 for a discussion of how these permit-based strategies can elicit 
state of the art information, moving pollution control in the direction of greater stringency, and 
how introduction of such information into permit proceedings is itself a challenge dependent on 
interested and expert or wealthy stakeholders. Blais and Wagner focus on how ―rulemaking 
ruts‖ lead to less ambitious agencies or the development of policy through informal processes. 
Blais & Wagner, supra note 13, at 1707. They do not analyze alternative means of reducing 
pollution such as through these permit-based adjudicatory triggers. See id. 
 90. See Buzbee, Adjudicatory Triggers of Enhanced Ambient Environment Information, 
supra note 75, at 594 (noting that a proposed new source in a nonattainment area sets in motion 
several information searches regarding the environment). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  CAA Dynamism and Disappointments 51 
 
 
numerous additional requirements.
91
 These statutory requirements 
push environmental performance toward improvement both at the 
source and jurisdictional level. 
First, a new source can only get a permit if, perhaps with the 
government‘s assistance, it can identify sources of similar pollution 
that the new source can somehow shut down in order to obtain 
needed offsets.
92
 New sources include both newly created sources 
and sources whose modifications deem them new under the law.
93
 
Basically, offsetting reductions must be found either from the new or 
modified source itself or from a different pollution source within its 
nonattainment area, with the amount of the required offset increasing 
as the level of nonattainment becomes more severe.
94
 These offset 
provisions make private actors who are interested in operating new 
sources into engines of environmental improvement and information. 
The statute creates incentives for them to minimize their own 
pollution and induce other sources to reduce their pollution as well. 
The provision also harnesses state and local government desire for 
new and expanding industry (with the usual associated employment 
and tax benefits) to prompt improved enforcement and tracking of 
unnecessarily high polluting sources. This offset provision is, in fact, 
a form of pollution trading, with NAAQS standards setting the 
jurisdictional cap level and the source-by-source search for offsets 
rewarding more efficient, or profitable, or low-polluting entities.
95
 
The track record of the offset provision has been mixed, with only a 
modest use of trades likely due to the lack of an open market for 
offset trades. The absence of an open and transparent market creates 
difficulty in finding offset trades; thus, many offset trades have been 
internal to the same source or source operator.
96
 
 
 91. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006). 
 92. Id. § 7412(d)(3).  
 93. Id. § 7411(a)(2).  
 94. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c). 
 95. See Michael C. Naughton, Establishing Interstate Markets for Emissions Trading of 
Ozone Precursors: The Case of the Northeast Ozone Transport Commission and the Northeast 
States for Coordinated Air Use Management Emissions Trading Proposals, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 195, 212 (1994) (explaining that the offset provisions of the CAA are forms of federal 
trading). 
 96. Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of 
EPA‟s Emission‟s Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 115 & n.44, 119–23 (1989). 
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The nonattainment new source offset provision utilizes another 
complementary strategy that aims to improve environmental 
performance.
97
 If the local jurisdiction has been found by EPA not to 
be adequately implementing its SIP, a permit cannot be issued.
98
 This 
provision thus uses the occasion of a proposed new or expanded 
business to trigger enforcement of the enforced reality of a 
jurisdiction‘s SIP. Similarly, the polluter itself must establish that it is 
in compliance or on track to come into compliance with its 
obligations elsewhere in the state.
99
  
The SIP process itself also creates incentives for identifying and 
protecting high-value, low-polluting actors. Each air quality area—
which typically are metropolitan areas—has to derive a plan by 
which the jurisdiction will meet or work to meet the NAAQS 
requirements.
100
 This includes identifying pollution sources and 
imposing pollution-reduction or cessation requirements on those 
sources. Inevitable changes in area activities and pollution sources 
create a rolling obligation to assess the state of air quality and 
pollution contributors. The SIP process has been plagued by delays 
and often modest environmental gains.
101
 And its rolling review 
attributes can make it hard to determine its status and requirements.
102
 
Nevertheless, the SIP construct is effective in involving citizens, 
polluters, and local, state, and federal governments in the 
investigation, planning, and enforcement process.
103
 A SIP that is 
 
 97. Buzbee, Adjudicatory Triggers of Enhanced Ambient Environment Information, supra 
note 75, at 595 (explaining the necessary informational searches under new source offset 
permits).  
 98. 42 U.S.C. § 7424(b)(1). 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 7420(a)(2). 
 100. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a). 
 101. See Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean 
Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1688–95 (1991) [hereinafter Latin, Regulating Failure, 
Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act] (describing mixed track record of SIPs 
and reasons its complicated requirements are vulnerable to regulatory failure); G. Nelson Smith 
& Evelio M. Grillo, Let‟s Clear the Air Once and for All: Municipal Liability for Failing to 
Comply with Section 110 of the Clean Air Act, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1103, 1116–28 (1995) 
(explaining that states often have not met their drafted timetables and that air pollution is still a 
problem in many major cities). 
 102. See Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from 
Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery under the Endangered Species 
Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 104 (2002).  
 103. See Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 
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illegal or actions in violation of a SIP are subject to citizen-initiated 
challenges.
104
 Reviewing federal officials also can review and reject 
state SIP choices.
105
 Allowances for multiple actor participation, 
oversight, and lookback and predictive analysis serve as a check on 
major illegality and create movement in the direction of 
environmental improvement. Relatedly, the obligation of 
nonattainment areas to improve air quality under the ―reasonable 
further progress‖ provision furthers the achievement of that 
obligation.
106
  
The provisions setting forth emission limitation criteria for new 
stationary sources in both nonattainment and attainment areas are 
especially well designed to reduce pollution levels and encourage 
cross-jurisdictional analysis and learning. Like all areas of the law, 
whether a statute fulfills its legal promise is highly dependent on the 
existence of active, motivated, and knowledgeable citizens or 
regulators. Citizen or regulatory actors, especially federal officials 
watching over state and local permitting actions, are able to monitor 
and check inertia or laxity of polluters or other regulators. Thus, 
federal oversight or citizen participation and oversight is essential for 
these provisions to fulfill their promise. Consequently, it must be 
acknowledged that a statute‘s implemented reality often is far below 
its ideal promise given a frequent lack of rigorous regulators and 
knowledgeable citizens or nonprofits. Nevertheless, these CAA 
provisions setting forth criteria for new and modified source levels of 
pollution control use a creative pro-stringency ratchet that builds on 
horizontal knowledge gained from other planners and benchmarked 
best-achieving similar sources. Because this scrutiny in setting 
pollution control requirements is done through an adjudicatory permit 
proceeding, each permit proceeding becomes a venue for 
reexamining what sorts of pollution control are possible. 
 
supra note 101, at 1709 (describing the need for cooperation among state and federal agencies). 
 104. Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on 
the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 50–57 (noting the availability of 
citizen-suit provisions and the difficulty of a successful citizen suit). 
 105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a), 7413(a). 
 106. 42 U.S.C. § 7501(1) (defining ―reasonable further progress‖); id. § 7502(c)(2) 
(requiring ―reasonable further progress‖). 
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For example, a new source in a nonattainment region must 
achieve the lowest achievable emission rate (―LAER‖). Importantly, 
LAER is not determined through a single, industry-by-industry 
notice-and-comment regulation but in a case-by-case permit-
adjudication setting.
107 
If a section 111 ―standard of performance‖ 
exists for that category, LAER cannot be set lower but can be more 
stringent. LAER itself is a sliding standard pegged to either ―the most 
stringent emission limitation‖ in any SIP in the nation (unless 
established by the source to be unachievable) or the most stringent 
emission limitation ―achieved in practice‖ by similar sources.108 The 
―more stringent‖ SIP requirement and emissions achieved in practice 
becomes the LAER limitation required of that source. This 
combination of a permit-based trigger for analysis of emission 
limitations and the horizontal analysis of most stringent jurisdictions 
or pollution-reduction accomplishments, combined with any existing 
section 111 ―standard of performance‖ setting a regulatory floor, 
makes this provision a dynamic one-way ratchet that updates 
information and moves toward stringency. The provision‘s 
effectiveness depends on dedicated permitters, federal officials, or 
citizens engaging in the time- and expertise-intensive process of 
learning about an industry, other jurisdictions‘ SIPs, permits, and 
levels of pollution.
109
 High-visibility permit battles are most likely to 
generate necessary cross-jurisdictional information. This strategy is 
not, however, without downsides. Because the new source review 
(―NSR‖) program triggers more stringent pollution-control 
requirements at the time of upgrade or new construction, it can 
discourage modernization and prompt production modernization 
strategies designed merely to evade burdens associated with NSR 
review.
110
  
 
 107. See id. § 7412(d)(3). 
 108. Id. § 7501(3). 
 109. See, e.g., Buzbee, Adjudicatory Triggers of Enhanced Ambient Environment 
Information, supra note 75, at 595 (noting that achieving LAER requires an informational 
search of SIPs and other pollution sources to determine the benchmark for LAER). 
 110. Nash & Revesz, supra note 25, at 1708–20 (discussing incentives created not to invest 
in facility improvements due to NSR program burdens); Robert N. Stavins, Vintage-
Differentiated Environmental Regulation, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 29, 49 (2006) (―Because of the 
incentives [NSR] creates to extend the life of older plants rather than build new, more 
stringently regulated, facilities, concern exists that NSR wastes resources and can retard 
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Like nonattainment NSR review and the LAER standard, NSR in 
attainment areas requires major stationary sources to comply with the 
CAA‘s requirements to prevent significant deterioration (―PSD‖) of 
air quality.
111
 Each facility subject to PSD permit requirements must 
achieve emissions control consistent with best available control 
technology (―BACT‖) requirements.112 BACT is set on a case-by-
case basis, similar to LAER-based permitting.
113
 It requires horizontal 
analysis of technology and other controls to determine what is 
―achievable‖ for a facility, considering a wide array of factors.114 It 
pushes sources and regulators less than LAER, but it also requires 
regulators and stakeholders to update information in determining 
BACT requirements. 
These various adjudicatory-setting, technology-based emission 
limitations offer an additional benefit, albeit with less direct 
encouragement of environmental progress. Notably absent from 
technology-based standards is any requirement that regulators adjust 
emission limitations in light of nuanced understanding of the 
surrounding ambient environment, other than taking into account a 
jurisdiction‘s attainment status. As others have noted, regulatory 
strategies setting requirements in light of nuanced attention to the 
ambient environment would be ideal.
115
 In reality, however, any 
requirement to adjust regulatory requirements in light of the ambient 
environment demands huge resources and levels of scientific and 
 
environmental progress.‖). See generally sources cited in supra note 3 (citing sources 
discussing paradoxical and harmful incentives created by portions of the CAA). 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 7471. 
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). 
 113. Id. 
 114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d), 7479(3). A wide array of citizen, state, and federally initiated 
litigation against power plants alleged that many such plants engaged in gradual modifications 
without making required pollution control investments required under NSR. See Buzbee, 
Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 39, at 123–25 (recounting the recent NSR 
litigation). This litigation continues. See, e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Obama, Ill. File NSR 
Litigation against Midwest Generation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/08/28/28greenwire-obama-ill-file-nsr-lawsuit-against-mid 
west-gen-33512.html?scp=1&sq=nsr&st=cse. 
 115. Latin, Ideal versus Real Regulatory Efficiency, supra note 3, at 1304–20 (contrasting 
demands of technology-based standards with poor track record of ambient-based regulation); 
Craig N. Oren, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: A Bridge to the Future?, 21 ENVTL. L. 
1817, 1825 (1991) (contending that scientific information needed to set ambient environmental 
quality standards is often lacking). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 32:33 
 
 
predictive capacity that remain elusive. By not utilizing nuanced 
ambient environment analysis, an additional source of delay and 
resource drain is avoided.  
Many permitting proceedings have occurred with little scrutiny, 
but a number of the more visible and fiercely litigated permitting 
proceedings have turned on the progress-inducing attributes of 
technology-based emission limitations. In Alaska Department of 
Environmental Conservation v. EPA, the Supreme Court had to 
determine federal rights to reject by administrative edict a lax PSD 
permit not meeting BACT requirements, where the permit had been 
sought by industry and ultimately approved by senior state 
regulators.
116
 The Supreme Court confirmed ―EPA‘s authority . . . to 
rule on the reasonableness of BACT decisions by state permitting 
authorities‖ and upheld EPA‘s rejection due to what appeared to be a 
state political override of contrary determinations by expert state 
staff.
117
 Similarly, in Deseret Power Plant, the Sierra Club advocated 
in an individualized permit proceeding that a power plant be 
subjected to BACT emission limits for carbon dioxide due to its role 
as a greenhouse gas.
118
 That citizen advocacy culminated in a major 
Environmental Appeals Board decision that even the Board 
recognized as confirming ―an issue of national scope that has 
implications far beyond this individual permitting proceeding.‖119 
 
 116. Alaska Dep‘t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 502 (2004).  
 117. Id. at 495. 
 118. Deseret Power Electric Cooperative, PSD Appeal No. 07-03 (Envtl. Appeals Bd. of 
the U.S. EPA, Nov. 13, 2008).  
 119. Id. at 4–5 (finding that historical agency interpretation was not a sufficient reason for 
Region 8 to choose not to impose a CO2 BACT limit). Sierra Club argued that CO2 is an air 
pollutant, so the permit must contain a BACT determination for CO2. Id. at 1. The Region did 
not make a CO2 BACT determination. Id. In response to the Deseret Power decision, then-
Administrator Stephen L. Johnson issued a memorandum dated December 18, 2008, that 
directed the EPA to interpret the definition of ―regulated NSR pollutant‖ of 40 C.F.R. 
§ 52.21(b)(50) ―to exclude pollutants for which EPA regulations only require monitoring or 
reporting but to include each pollutant subject to either a provision in the Clean Air Act or 
regulation adopted by EPA under the Clean Air Act that requires actual control of emissions of 
that pollutant.‖ Memorandum from EPA Adm‘r Stephen L. Johnson to the EPA Reg‘l Adm‘rs, 
EPA‘s Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Federal Prevention 
of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permit Program 1 (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ 
documents/psd_interpretive_memo_12.18.08.pdf. Under the Obama administration, the EPA 
agreed to reconsider its position that some GHGs, including carbon dioxide, are not subject to 
regulation. Robin Bravender, EPA Reconsiders ‗Johnson Memo‘ on Carbon Emission, N.Y. 
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Similarly, in an incredibly long permit proceeding in New York City, 
the proposed Brooklyn Navy Yard waste-to-energy facility was 
intensively scrutinized in a multi-year proceeding before an 
administrative law judge, with major environmental groups 
introducing testimony and monitoring the proceeding.
120
 The idea 
was to ensure that this facility was operated safely and with minimal 
pollution and to use the proceeding to inform future similar 
proceedings.
121
 In battling over which pollution reductions were 
achievable, the environmental groups surveyed similar facilities 
around the world.
122
  
As federal climate legislation was avoided and later debated, and 
the ability to regulate GHGs was argued before the Supreme Court in 
2006, pressure to regulate greenhouse gases was applied in 
Georgia.
123
 The Georgia Center for Law in the Public Interest,
124
 
acting on behalf of clients such as the Sierra Club, fiercely litigated 
emission limitations required for a major coal burning power plant.
125
 
In that matter, citizen stakeholders sought to push emission 
 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009. For a law firm‘s concise summary of these actions, see McGuire Woods, 
Reading the Tea Leaves: Obama EPA‟s Granting of Sierra Club Petition to Reconsider 
Regulations under the Clean Air Act, Feb. 23, 2009, available at http://www.mcguirewoods. 
com/news-resources/item.asp?item=3747.  
 120. Brooklyn Navy Yard, N.Y. Dep‘t of Envtl. Conservation (Fifth Interim Decision, 
Sept. 9, 1993) (explaining that in over five years of permit proceedings, the facility had been 
subject to intensive environmental review by the government and the public). The permit was 
ultimately granted, id., but a subsequent state law change precluded the incinerator‘s 
construction. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 27-0706 (McKinney 2007). The author worked on 
this matter for the Natural Resources Defense Council on a cooperative basis with attorneys 
from other environmental groups, including the Environmental Defense Fund.  
 121. See id.  
 122. William Bunch, There‟s the Rubbish, Incinerator Debate Heats Up: Now It‟s a Matter 
of Garbage In or Garbage Out-of-State, NEWSDAY, Feb. 20, 1994, at 1. 
 123. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (finding that CO2 and other GHGs 
qualify as air pollutants under the CAA). 
 124. The Georgia Center for Law in the Public Interest was later renamed Greenlaw. The 
Georgia Center for Law in the Public Interest is Now Greenlaw, http://green-law.org/net/ 
content/go.aspx?s=57253.0.0.19069 (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
 125. See Longleaf Energy Ass‘n v. Friends of Chattahoochee, Inc., 681 S.E.2d 203, 209 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that the Fulton County Superior Court erred in ruling that the 
proposed power plant should use Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle technology to 
minimize pollution in its BACT analysis); see also Matthew L. Wald, Georgia Judge Cites 
Carbon Dioxide in Denying Coal Plant Permit, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008, at C4. For a 
recounting of this history and link to other decisions, see http://green-law.org/core/item/ 
page.asp?s=83885.0.101.19069. 
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limitations down, introducing evidence of low-polluting facilities 
elsewhere, arguing for limits on carbon dioxide, and garnering 
national coverage.
126
  
In all of these battles, progress was made by applying the 
substantive criteria of the CAA. In addition, federal oversight and 
citizen participation ensured that experts, state permitters, and 
industry had a voice to push for environmental progress. Pollution-
trading provisions can also be effective in achieving environmental 
goals, especially the desire for cost-effective progress. A major 
question is whether the market‘s search for low-cost emissions 
reductions will similarly serve to foment fundamental reassessment 
of what pollution reductions are achievable.  
C. Acid Rain Trading Provisions 
The CAA‘s provisions pertaining to acid rain, which create a 
sulfur dioxide trading regime, have been much lauded and 
analyzed.
127
 Due to movement of sulfur dioxide from the Midwest to 
the Northeast, acid rain was forming and causing numerous harms to 
water bodies, infrastructure, and buildings.
128
 Sulfur dioxide also 
posed health risks.
129
 Rather than rely on technological mandates or 
technology-based emissions limitations, such as BACT, LAER, or 
New Source Performance Standards, Congress set a downward 
sliding aggregate cap on sulfur dioxide emissions.
130
 The 1990 
Amendments mostly doled out pollution allowances to grandfathered 
industry participants, and then allowed pollution sources to trade 
 
 126. See sources cited in note 125, supra; Longleaf Energy Ass‟n, 681 S.E.2d at 210. 
 127. See, e.g., Nathaniel O. Keohane, Cost Savings from Allowance Trading in the 1990 
Clean Air Act: Estimates from a Choice-Based Model, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 194–229 
(Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007) [hereinafter MOVING TO MARKETS]; cf. David 
Schoenbrod & Richard B. Stewart, The Cap-and-Trade Bait and Switch, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 
2009, at A13, available at http://www.wsj.com (search ―The Cap-And-Trade Bait and Switch‖; 
then follow ―The Cap-And-Trade Bait and Switch‖ hyperlink) (praising simpler forms of cap-
and-trade such as the sulfur dioxide trading regime designed to attack acid rain and criticizing 
elements of the House climate change bill). 
 128. Karkkainen, supra note 21, at 1418 (explaining that pollution from the Midwest 
affected the Northeast and New England). 
 129. Id. (noting the reduced mortality rates following acid rain regulation). 
 130. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–549, 104 Stat. 2399. 
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among themselves.
131
 Over time, an increasing percentage of 
pollution allowances were sold through auction. The goal was to 
allow the market to identify the lowest cost emitters, or most 
profitable polluters, and allow those polluters through trades to 
determine who would derive the greatest value from buying or selling 
allowances. Through this trade-based regime, the amendments 
created incentives to shut down or control high-polluting sources. 
The dynamism anticipated for the Amendments was based on the 
promise of the ―invisible hand‖ of the market. This cap-and-trade 
strategy would harness market incentives to identify low cost or 
profitable investments in pollution control that, in turn, would 
generate allowances that could be sold, or avoid polluter need to buy 
allowances. This market-based regime would thereby ease progress 
toward reductions in acid rain and other harms associated with sulfur 
dioxide. 
With a uniform type of pollution and mostly large, easily 
identified sources, creating the market was relatively easy. In 
addition, such a trading regime avoids placing near-impossible 
informational burdens on regulators never fully privy to the 
production process. Rather, pollution sources under this trading 
regime could undertake analyses of their own production modes, 
costs, and benefits, and determine optimal means to reduce pollution 
and sell pollution allowances or minimize the need to buy pollution 
rights.
132
  
The reality was far less auspicious than sometimes attributed to 
this program. Allowances were initially allocated by legislative gift to 
earlier polluters, based largely on historic levels of pollution.
133
 This 
grandfathering strategy rewarded large polluters and failed to harness 
the incentives associated with an auction of allowances. If allowances 
were auctioned rather than distributed for free under a grandfathering 
strategy, new and old polluters would have equal opportunities to 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Cf. Karkkainen, supra note 21, at 1418–19 (analyzing the informational burdens on 
regulators and noting that market-based approaches like the one found in the CAA‘s acid rain 
provisions represent a possible solution to informational deficits). 
 133. See Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving 
toward Strigency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 399–400 (2009) (discussing overallocation of 
pollution allowances and effects of free distribution of allowances rather than use of auctions).  
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play in the market, and all emitters would have immediate monetary 
incentives to reduce pollution.
134
 Increased demand for allowances 
would have buttressed the price;
135
 free allowances, in contrast, will 
depress the price. A second major flaw was the level of the cap itself. 
The cap was set so high that most polluters had little incentive to 
improve their operations.
136
 Thus, due to the grandfathering 
giveaways and the lax cap, technological progress was slow and the 
market‘s incentives and rewards were weak.137 Early allowance 
investors dramatically overpaid for pollution rights since market 
prices quickly dropped
138
 and remained low for years.
139
 Still, this 
trading regime was successful from the viewpoint of cost-effective 
achievement of pollution-reduction goals, even if initially too lax. 
Despite these flaws, the acid rain trading program served as a model 
for imitation and avoidance in subsequent bodies of regulation, 
especially climate change legislation and agreements both at the 
domestic and international level.
140
  
 
 134. See Scott R. Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm Incentives to Promote Technological 
Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 247, 260–61 (1989) (assessing 
incentives for pollution control and concluding that taxes or auctioned allowances create the 
strongest incentives). 
 135. Chulho Jung et al., Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the 
Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 95, 108–09 
(1996) (concluding that auctions will increase prices and foster greater rewards and hence 
incentives for innovation). 
 136. In addition, despite any new information about the costs and benefits of sulfur 
dioxide, the caps could only be changed by an act of Congress. Winston Harrington & Richard 
D. Morgenstern, International Experience with Competing Approaches to Environmental 
Policy: Results from Six Paired Cases, in MOVING TO MARKETS, supra note 127, at 95, 134; 
McAllister, supra note 133, at 399–403 (discussing how under the acid rain trading regime too 
many allowances were issued and the cap too lax to incentivize and reward polluters investing 
in means to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions). 
 137. See David M. Driesen, Design, Trading, and Innovation, in MOVING TO MARKETS, 
supra note 127, at 436, 452–53 (reexamining whether technological changes were actually 
innovations brought on because of the sulfur dioxide trading program).  
 138. Cf. Harrington & Morganstern, supra note 136, at 97–98, 141 & n.4 (explaining that 
allowances were allocated in proportion to fuel consumption during 1985–87). 
 139. Id. at 135–36 (noting that many facilities made major investments that created a glut 
and caused the price of allowances to crash). 
 140. See BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION 
IN THE 109TH CONGRESS 4 (2006), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/50818.pdf (―The 
United States has no federal GHG reduction requirements, though there are proposals to require 
such reductions. . . . [The] market-based [proposals] typically take as their model the Clean Air 
Act‘s acid rain program.‖). 
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D. State and Local Climate Change Innovations 
One brief, additional point should be made about the CAA and its 
lessons for climate legislation. In the years leading up to Congress‘s 
consideration of federal climate change legislation in 2009 and 2010, 
state and local governments enacted numerous laws to address 
climate change, utilizing their broad retained authority under the 
CAA to protect the environment more than required under federal 
law.
141
 As discussed above, California and other piggybacking states 
sought to require GHG limitations on cars, even as the federal 
legislative and executive branches resisted these regulations.
142
 These 
state and local initiatives have tested diverse strategies to reduce 
energy usage and directly attack GHG emissions; several states and 
regions even devised their own cap-and-trade regimes.
143
 In addition 
to serving as testing grounds and templates for federal legislation, 
state and local regulation of GHG emissions has served as a catalyst 
for incipient industry support for a federal law. In this setting, as in 
past federal environmental legislative dynamics, some industry 
opponents of federal action have become perhaps reluctant supporters 
of federal legislation in the hope that federal law will reduce 
disparities in a ―patchwork‖ of laws or will result in a less onerous 
 
 141. See, e.g., Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, supra note 39, at 1021–
25; Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation, supra note 39, at 683–
88.  
 142. See supra notes 69 & 71 and accompanying text. 
 143. See generally Matt Bogoshian & Ken Alex, The Essential Role of State Enforcement 
in the Brave New World of Greenhouse Gas Emission Limits, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 
337 (2009); Jim Doyle, Challenges and Opportunities for Regulating Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions at the State, Regional and Local Level, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 213 (2009); 
Paul E. Farrell, Climate Change Action in Connecticut: Linking Energy, the Environment and 
the Economy, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 281 (2009); William Funk, Constitutional 
Implications of Regional CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs: The Northeast Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative as a Case in Point, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 353 (2009); Ken Kimmell & 
Laurie Burt, Massachusetts Takes on Climate Change, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 295 
(2009); Jim Martin & Ginny Brannon, A Colorado Perspective: The New Energy Economy, 27 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 269 (2009); Mary D. Nichols, California‟s Climate Change 
Program: Lessons for the Nation, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 185 (2009); Steve Owens, 
Climate Change Action in Arizona, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 317 (2009); Douglas Scott, 
The Role of Illinois and the Midwest in Responding to the Challenges of Climate Change, 27 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 261 (2009); Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing 
Climate of Cooperative Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy to 
Combat Climate Change, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 231 (2009).  
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but preemptive federal law.
144
 It is critical to recognize that none of 
these regulatory experiments and innovations would have been 
possible had the CAA not unequivocally preserved state authority to 
go beyond the protections offered by federal law.
145
 
III. CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATIVE CHOICES IN LIGHT OF CLEAN 
AIR ACT LESSONS 
The current leading climate bills are the Waxman-Markey 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (―ACES‖), as 
passed by the House of Representatives at the end of June 2009,
146
 
and the proposed Senate bill, Clean Energy Jobs and American 
Power Act (―CEJAP‖), sponsored by Senators Kerry, Boxer, and 
Kirk, which emerged in draft form in September 2009.
147
 Included 
within the almost 1500 pages of ACES text is the Safe Climate Act, a 
bill focused exclusively on addressing climate change.
148
 Portions of 
ACES, the Safe Climate Act, and CEJAP will face additional changes 
in the Senate. At this point any climate bill faces an uphill battle as 
partisan gridlock continues to plague Congress. These bills likely will 
continue to face a well funded opposition campaign by industry, 
including vast sums for lobbying and support for, if not creation of, 
grassroots opposition.
149
 In addition, a complex array of other 
 
 144. Numerous scholars have noted this dynamic. See RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, 
MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 209 (1st ed. 1999); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form 
of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1504–08 (2007); 
E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of 
Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326 (1985); Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. 
Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 223–26 (2005) (labeling this phenomenon a ―domino effect‖ in which state 
regulation triggers industry to prefer federal regulation); Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative 
Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a 
Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 798–803 (2008) (exploring an array of benefits of 
preserving state autonomy for climate change regulatory goals). 
 145. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text (discussing the CAA‘s use of a savings 
clause and floor preemption provisions). 
 146. References generally will be to H.R. 2454, as passed by the House of Representatives 
on June 26, 2009. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
 147. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 148. H.R. 2454 § VII. 
 149. Editorial, Another Astroturf Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at A20 (critically 
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political challenges, such as wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a recession 
and financial crisis, and health care legislation debates, make 2009 
and 2010 inauspicious times for a climate bill. But the scientific 
evidence of climate change and associated risks continues to 
strengthen, and international efforts to enact a successor to the Kyoto 
Protocol all create strong countervailing pressures. Thus, a climate 
bill‘s prospects are highly uncertain.  
Still, the several iterations of leading climate bills have several 
basic attributes. This Part looks at several of the basic regulatory 
design choices likely to be included in United States climate 
legislation. This Part then reflects on such legislation‘s promise and 
risks in light of CAA lessons. 
The House and Senate bills contain myriad provisions mandating 
or encouraging far more efficient appliances, home and building 
construction, renewable energy use, clean transportation, and more 
efficient cars and modes of transportation.
150
 They also support 
research into and regulation of carbon sequestration. It is anticipated 
that carbon sequestration technology will allow carbon to be buried 
or rendered inert rather than emitted as a GHG.
151
 Many of those 
provisions have freestanding logic and good prospects since they 
promise to save money, reduce risk by reducing energy use, and 
move many areas of United States law closer to requirements 
elsewhere around the globe. However, these proposed provisions 
undercut reliance on regulatory strategies that would use the market 
to sort out the best means to reduce pollution.
152
 The federal 
government is, in effect, picking some of the winners and losers of a 
post-climate change bill economy. The benefit they provide is to 
select areas where improvements would generate efficiency and 
environmental benefits even if a cap does not provide an adequate 
price signal to reward improvements on its own. In essence, these 
provisions offer a backstop to sole reliance on market incentives 
under a cap-and-trade scheme. The bills‘ provisions focusing on 
 
commenting on industry support for what appear to be grassroots events opposing a federal 
climate change bill). 
 150. Most of these provisions appear in ACES Title I (―Clean Energy‖) and Title II 
(―Energy Efficiency‖). See H.R. 2454 §§ I, II. 
 151. See id. § I(B). 
 152. See Schoenbrod & Stewart, supra note 127 (criticizing ACES on this ground). 
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technology and incentivizing energy efficiency constitute retention of 
diverse regulatory strategies to reduce GHG emissions.  
Provisions setting up a GHG cap-and-trade regime are the heart of 
the House and Senate bills.
153
 A climate-oriented cap-and-trade 
program would set a series of declining caps on annual aggregate 
GHG emissions and distribute only enough allowances so the cap is 
not exceeded. Holders of GHG allowances could trade them. The 
underlying logic is that emitters would best be able to assess cost-
effective means to reduce emissions or acquire additional emission 
rights where necessary. This rewards low emitters and gains in 
efficiency and helps support a market for innovators in pollution and 
emission reduction technology.
154
 Additionally, polluters could use 
offset credits in a cap-and-trade regime. With offset credits, polluters 
would undertake environmentally beneficial activities that reduce 
GHG levels to generate credits. Those credits then could be used in 
ways similar to or in lieu of allowances.  
Several major caveats must be recognized. Environmental 
progress and related market incentives are virtually completely 
dependent on several conditions: that a stringent cap will be set, 
creating scarcity to reward reductions and innovation; that caps and 
trades will be well monitored so the market is secure and rewarding; 
and that surrounding politics will remain committed to GHG 
reductions.
155
 If the cap is set too low, or the market porous, corrupt, 
or lacking in reinforcing regulatory oversight, or the political realm 
 
 153. See H.R. 2454 §§ III, VII, and VIII (forming the heart of the Safe Climate Act). 
Comparable provisions are in Title VII and VIII of the Boxer-Kerry bill. 
 154. For articles discussing the basic logic of cap-and-trade regimes, with a focus on its use 
to address GHGs and climate change, see Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade 
System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 348–53 (2008) (comparing 
and preferring a cap-and-trade scheme to a carbon tax approach); Richard B. Stewart & 
Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Change: Issues of 
Design and Practicality, 9 ARIZ. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 83, 103–106 (1992) (discussing cap-and-
trade in the international context). See also Jonathan B. Wiener, Radiative Forcing: Climate 
Policy to Break the Logjam in Environmental Law, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210, 238–42 (2008) 
[hereinafter Wiener, Radiative Forcing] (advocating a cap-and-trade scheme for GHG 
emissions). For a more critical assessment of the mechanics and track record of cap-and-trade 
regimes, see McAllister, supra note 133. 
 155. For in-depth exploration of the risk of political unraveling of a climate change deal 
and the concomitant need for ―precommitment strategies,‖ see Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems 
and Climate Change, supra note 29, at 1187–1231. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  CAA Dynamism and Disappointments 65 
 
 
credibly threatens to weaken the law, then a cap-and-trade bill could 
easily fail. The following sections reflect on the CAA‘s lessons for 
several of the climate bill‘s most important regulatory choices. 
A. Error and Inertia Risks: Mixed Prospects 
The CAA is often criticized for its complexity and the many 
challenging tasks it imposes on EPA.
156
 Champions of the cap-and-
trade strategy tout the simplicity and elegance of cap-and-trade 
regimes as a means to empower private actors with greater 
information to be creative, at less cost.
157
 Once created, operational, 
and stable, this would likely be true. However, the many demands of 
the leading climate bills would impose a huge array of regulatory 
deadlines and burdens on EPA and other executive branch actors, 
creating a likely near-constant state of flux and reexamination that 
could derail the launch and ongoing implementation of climate 
legislation. The CAA experience confirms the magnitude of the 
implementation challenge.  
As discussed above, CAA section 111 ―standards of performance‖ 
for new stationary air pollution sources have been plagued by missed 
deadlines and antiquated standards, in large part because of the 
challenging regulatory tasks involved.
158
 Similarly, section 112 has 
been plagued by delays, likely also attributable to onerous demands 
of notice–and-comment rulemaking. Prior to the 1990 Amendments, 
section 112, which required EPA to set levels of permissible 
hazardous air pollutant emissions taking into account health risks, 
rather than technological capabilities, proved even more of a failure 
due to the near-impossible task it demanded; with non-threshold 
hazardous air pollutants, no level of exposure could convincingly be 
deemed safe.
159
 A proposed climate bill would not compel the same 
 
 156. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, supra note 3, at 1334–
40. 
 157. See Wiener, Radiative Forcing, supra note 154, at 238–39. 
 158. See supra notes 18–21. 
 159. Thomas O. McGarity, Hazardous Air Pollutants, Migrating Hot Spots, and the 
Prospect of Data-Driven Regulation of Complex Industrial Complexes, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1445, 
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near-impossible task imposed by the pre-1990 version of section 112. 
However, the underlying climate change science, politics, and 
economics would need to be assessed on a near-constant basis under 
the leading climate bills, arguably presenting an even more 
formidable challenge. These bills would certainly require a far more 
massive sequence of tasks for involved agencies and departments, 
many of whom would be dependent on each other‘s work. 
The climate bills also would impose rigorous analytical periodic 
reporting and amendment requirements. The bills appear to anticipate 
the risks of delay and inaction and thus include dozens of specific 
time deadlines.
160
 Moreover, for some of the larger regulatory 
analytical tasks, the bills create an invited parallel role for the 
National Academy of Sciences (―NAS‖).161 NAS is asked to perform 
the same task of updating information on climate change if EPA fails 
to do as required.  
The many independent EPA obligations are only the tip of the 
iceberg. In numerous provisions, interested parties can petition EPA 
to adjust its actions, including petitions regarding centrally important 
items like the identity of GHGs, their climate potential or equivalence 
in relation to carbon dioxide, and adjustments to carbon allowances 
and usable offsets.
162
 For many of these tasks, EPA is also obligated 
to undertake in-depth analysis of health, environmental, and 
economic effects, sometimes including opportunities for peer-
reviewed oversight.
163
 Many of the key operational elements of the 
climate bills also appear to require pre-implementation regulatory 
steps; regulatory actions are not just a means over time to correct and 
tweak the bill as necessitated by changing science, political, and 
market developments. Instead, they often are a condition precedent to 
making the bill an implemented reality.  
These provisions have the salutary goal and partial effect of 
avoiding wholesale regulatory imprudence. Thus, major mistakes are 
checked by regulatory deadlines, reexamination, and petition 
 
 160. See, e.g., H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 735, 737, 740, 792 (2009); S. 1733, 111th Cong. 
§§ 303, 311 (2009). 
 161. See, e.g., H.R. 2454 §§ 464, 553; S. 1733 § 354. 
 162. See, e.g., H.R. 2454 §§ 311, 312, 721(e); S. 1733 §§ 311, 312, 721(e). 
 163. See, e.g., H.R. 2454 § 113(b); S. 1733 §§ 123(a), 705(a). 
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provisions. On the other hand, a huge question is whether these many 
tasks would derail implementation of the cap-and-trade regime so it 
would not become operational in a timely way. If the Act itself would 
initiate a cap-and-trade system while allowing for subsequent 
corrective actions, then these allowances would reduce risks of large 
scale failure. If they threaten the entire scheme with too much delay 
and uncertainty, as unfortunately appears likely, they could defeat the 
entire regime or at least create a lengthy period of legal and carbon 
market instability.  
Thus, these climate bills pose failure risks like that created by 
CAA sections 111 and 112, both before and after its 1990 
amendments, by imposing onerous regulatory and analytical burdens 
on EPA. They also, however, empower numerous actors to review 
and check EPA actions and revisit and correct default legislative 
choices, and thus are somewhat reminiscent of CAA nonattainment 
provisions‘ empowerment of numerous actors.164 The climate bills‘ 
onerous review provisions thus serve to avoid enduring error but in 
the process threaten to create regulatory overload and extensive 
subsequent litigation.  
In climate bill provisions allowing for technology-based 
regulation of coal-burning power plants and stationary sources not 
initially subject to capped emissions, these bills rely on a notice-and-
comment mode of action to derive emissions limitations. If the 
CAA‘s track record holds true here, then utilization of a notice-and-
comment regime, without at least an accompanying permit-by-permit 
opportunity for consideration of more stringent limitations, poses 
substantial risks of delay and inertia. Without permit-by-permit 
scrutiny and opportunities for public input, experts, citizens, and not-
for-profits would have infrequent opportunities to establish that lower 
emissions levels are possible and should be required. Although GHGs 
do not fit easily into an attainment/nonattainment structure with air 
quality control region-planning as under the CAA SIP provisions, a 
similar structure could be used with climate legislation. Jurisdictions 
or perhaps geographic regions could be allocated a GHG cap under 
which permit-specific pollution reductions could be imposed. As 
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occurred with CAA sections 111 and 112, the climate bills‘ 
preference for notice-and-comment regulation of large sources rather 
than case-by-case emission limitations threatens to lead to delay and 
outdated limitations. 
B. Weakening Federalism‟s Benefits 
The CAA harnesses state action in numerous ways, offering states 
the option of implementing the statute under delegated program 
provisions, preserving their ability to be more protective of their 
citizens and the environment through savings clauses and floor 
preemption provisions. The CAA also preserves the viability of 
common law regimes and the ongoing incentives for environmental 
improvement they create.
165
 For example, as discussed above, even 
where the CAA is preemptive in its provisions regarding motor 
vehicle emissions standards, it avoids a regulatory monopoly by 
giving California and piggybacking states the ability to require even 
more.
166
 In addition, the CAA operates by retaining concurrent state, 
federal, and citizen roles in enforcing the laws both against polluters 
and governments who might miss obligations.
167
 
Furthermore, these various CAA provisions provide latitude for 
experimentation, innovation, and regulatory learning.
168
 These CAA 
provisions created the regulatory space for state and local climate 
change laws and regional agreements that have led the way in this 
country in addressing climate change ills.
169
  
The new federal climate bills reflect ambivalence about the 
retention of independent and shared state roles. Most significantly, 
they both would preempt state and regional cap-and-trade regimes for 
six years after the launch of a federal cap-and-trade regime. In 
addition, these bills‘ near-exclusive reliance on a cap-and-trade 
program would do little to harness the expertise and motivations of 
federal and state regulators and citizen activists. However, they also 
attempt to allow states to continue utilizing other strategies and 
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statutes to reduce pollution, including GHG pollution, by 
emphasizing that their provisions would only preempt state efforts 
that utilize cap-and-trade strategies. On a more specific basis, the 
earlier provisions of the broader ACES bill create standards for 
efficiency in several areas and affirm the authority of states to 
provide additional regulation and similarly directed incentives. 
However, by picking the particular actors and activities that are 
favored under the law, these bills would undercut the ability of states 
or the market to make different choices. 
For reasons that are unclear, some provisions in these bills leave 
the scope of state power uncertain due to some potentially 
contradictory provisions. Both bills amend the CAA‘s savings clause, 
but keep most of its original CAA savings clause language, so state 
authority to regulate GHGs is preserved. As mentioned above, they 
also preserve state authority to regulate GHG emissions through 
means other than cap-and-trade markets during and after the six year 
preemptive period.
170
 However, ACES expressly precludes regulation 
of GHGs under numerous CAA provisions.
171
 These provisions 
appear targeted at EPA but are not limited solely to it. In fact, they do 
not identify exactly who is disempowered. This is problematic 
because many state air pollution laws were enacted in order to 
receive delegated program status from EPA. Many of these state laws 
were expressly intended to carry out the programmatic tasks in the 
CAA that, as amended, would now prohibit consideration of GHG 
emissions as the basis for regulation. Could states rely on their now 
freestanding state laws that were enacted to comply with the CAA 
and regulate GHGs where EPA is forbidden to do so? The answer 
appears to be affirmative, but the language and section interactions 
leave the resulting law far less than lucid. In addition, a scattered 
series of savings clauses within the overall ACES bill could create 
arguments that only specified state authorities are in fact preserved.
172
 
 
 170. See S. 1733, 111th Cong. §§ 124, 125 (2009); H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 334, 335 
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CEJAP would avoid this conundrum by preserving EPA‘s CAA 
authority.
173
 
Relatedly, a critical question is whether state and local 
governments could impose their own additional GHG emission 
requirements on polluters and also preclude them from profiting by 
selling potentially unused allowances to polluters in other 
jurisdictions.
174
 Without such authority, state efforts to speed climate 
change progress would be futile, since the emissions would just result 
elsewhere, a phenomenon generally characterized as ―leakage.‖175 A 
source with excess allowances could simply sell them to other 
jurisdictions unless the state could somehow preclude such use. The 
climate bills appear to allow such limitations.  
Still, the lack of a meaningful state role in allocating pollution 
allowances after initially grandfathered allowances taper means that 
ultimately several sorts of additional state and local GHG emission 
constraints could still be vulnerable to the leakage problem. A 
jurisdiction that chooses to require more stringent levels of control 
might disadvantage its own industry and tax base; the production and 
the benefits it would create would simply go to bidders in other 
jurisdictions. States wishing to lower overall levels of GHG 
emissions either would have to buy and retire the allowances with 
their own money, retire allowances, or charge more in allowances per 
emission unit. These sorts of measures could cause governmental or 
private sector fiscal hardship but at least would allow states to act to 
reduce national emissions. Both the Senate and House bills preserve 
state power to take such actions.  
In addition, two key provisions of ACES regulating coal plants 
and other major stationary sources of GHGs not subject to cap 
limitations set new performance standards akin to those in section 
111.
176
 This regulatory design choice poses its own risks of inertia, as 
 
 173. See, e.g., S. 1733 § 125. 
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mentioned above. For federalism purposes, the problem is that these 
two provisions contain no provision-specific language reaffirming 
state and local governments‘ ability to require more stringent permit 
limitations due to GHG concerns.  
The absence in either leading bill of a new broad cross-cutting 
climate regulation savings clause and lack of opening findings or 
policy declarations applauding state climate regulation opens the door 
for preemption claims when a state chooses to act in a new and 
innovative way. The amended CAA savings clause language within 
the time-limited cap-and-trade preemptive period should preserve 
state authority to do more to combat climate change, but contrary 
arguments are somewhat tenable. Since numerous agencies are given 
roles in these bills and numerous statutes amended, even better would 
be the addition of a broadly sweeping savings clause and related 
findings applicable to the enacted climate legislation. Such a 
provision would greatly reduce the risk of subsequent preemption 
resulting from statutory ambiguity. 
The cap-and-trade amendments to the CAA pose several 
additional problems. A time-limited preemption would undercut 
investment in and utilization of state programs. In addition, as now 
appears likely, if the federal cap is more lax than existing state and 
regional cap-and-trade regimes, then the economic pressure and 
rewards they could offer would be undercut. Even more problematic, 
if the many pre-implementation regulatory requirements that EPA 
and other regulators must flesh out through new regulations and 
implementation steps lead to delay in launching the federal program, 
then under ACES a time gap could exist between state and regional 
plans and a federal regime. CEJAP appears to avoid this by delaying 
the preemption phase until the federal program is operational.
177
  
The political price to build an enacting coalition supportive of a 
climate change bill may be that Congress will in effect have to buy 
major industry support with large, valuable allowances giveaways. 
As a matter of sound policy, however, an approach giving a greater 
role to states would work far better. This approach would divide up 
 
 177. See S. 1733 § 125 (amending the CAA by adding section 861(b), which appears to 
trigger the preemptive period upon the first auction of allowances if the federal program is 
delayed). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 32:33 
 
 
allowances among the many states, giving each state the choice of 
how to use and allocate allowances. The formula allocating 
allowances to states would itself be a major and inherently political 
battle requiring consideration of population size, economic vitality, 
and pollution sources, among other likely variables.  
Nevertheless, if most allowances were distributed to states for 
state-determined allocation decisions, instead of Congress itself 
giving away most allowances for free, it could generate several 
benefits. First, states are closer to their economic, social, political, 
and environmental needs and goals and could tailor their distribution 
choices. They might even decide to auction the allowances, or give 
them to consumers. The latitude provided states would be akin to that 
provided to states under the CAA‘s SIP regime. Greater latitude for 
policy innovation would be created. Using the states to distribute 
allowances would also address the leakage problem by allowing a 
state simply to withhold some allowances if the state believed federal 
caps were too lax. The state could then choose how many to auction 
and whether to retire some, thereby driving progress even if the 
federal cap proved to be inordinately lax. It is highly unlikely, 
however, that Congress would surrender to states these distributional 
choices given the political attention and reward they could generate 
for federal legislators. 
In addition, the hundreds of tasks and deadlines that would be 
imposed on federal agencies, especially EPA, coupled with the task 
of overseeing the integrity of the allowance and offset regimes and 
related trading, are a recipe for overload and regulatory failure. In 
contrast, many states, local governments, and regions have 
substantially more experience than does the federal government in 
encouraging greater energy efficiency, attacking climate change 
causes and effects, and setting up and monitoring GHG cap-and-trade 
markets. Perhaps the federal government should take another page 
from the CAA book and create delegated program structures whereby 
states could assume an array of climate change regulatory roles. Such 
structures would provide latitude for diverse approaches to encourage 
climate change improvement, potentially including some latitude for 
diversity in how jurisdictions monitor a cap-and-trade market. At a 
minimum, a broad, climate bill-wide citizen suit provision 
empowering citizens and states to take enforcement actions against 
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private and governmental violators could help ensure that even 
during periods of regulatory inattention or sloppiness, the law‘s 
requirements could be enforced and the cap-and-trade market‘s 
integrity protected. 
C. Trading Regulatory Diversity of Strategies and Stakeholders for 
Market Dynamics 
The climate bills broadly trade the CAA‘s diverse regulatory 
strategies and broad empowerment of numerous actors, both public 
and private, for legislation that would rely overwhelmingly on market 
dynamics to drive progress. Many climate bill provisions choose or 
favor some preferred winners with special allowance allocations and 
subsidies, but broad progress will depend primarily on the cap and a 
viable trading market. 
Scientists emphasize the need to act quickly and bring emissions 
down, but the federal bill delays the regulatory day of reckoning until 
2012. Even then, it starts with cap levels that, both as initially set and 
ratcheted down over time, may be too lax to play an appropriate part 
in arresting climate change. This would create two substantial risks. 
First, if the cap is too lax to stem climate change trends, then harmful 
environmental feedback loops may accelerate; later reductions may 
be too late. Second, a lax cap would, by its nature, not create the 
scarcity that would drive innovations. Without high allowance costs 
or the promise of profits through pollution reductions and 
development of means to reduce energy use or GHG emissions, 
innovation incentives would be weak. Unlimited ability to bank 
allowances would further reduce innovation rewards and associated 
incentives, but banking at least would create rewards for polluters 
making early GHG pollution reductions. With delay and the ongoing 
risk of subsequent weakening of a climate change law, incentives for 
early investments in climate-related technological innovations would 
be undercut. 
Once caps start declining to the level where polluters feel the 
pinch and innovators see the reward, then a cap-and-trade regime 
would facilitate cost-effective progress. Through reliance on the 
market-based climate scheme, there should be less information-
intensive regulatory standard-setting plagued by industry opposition 
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and strategic use and misuse of information.
178
 However, before that 
point, the bills would do little to require polluters or others to take 
easy steps to increase energy efficiency or reduce GHG emissions. 
As mentioned above, states can seek to require more progress, but 
leakage risks are real. Large polluters and users of energy may for 
years face little or no incentive to improve.  
On the enforcement side, the leading bills do not contain explicit 
new citizen suit language, as was proposed in earlier discussion 
drafts. They also, however, do not delete or undercut ongoing 
reliance on the CAA‘s current citizen suit provision, and much of 
these bills would amend the CAA. Other provisions, however, hand 
regulatory turf to an array of governmental actors, with ACES 
perhaps most importantly delegating responsibility for offsets to the 
Department of Agriculture (―USDA‖) or over market integrity to the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (―CFTC‖).179 It is far 
from clear how the CFTC, USDA, and other agencies‘ roles will be 
checked or supplemented by citizen or state participation and 
litigation. States under the CAA have long relied on citizen suit and 
participation provisions to justify challenges to illegal or delayed 
federal actions and for suits against polluters. The USDA and CFTC 
do not have the same track record and experience working with 
delegated programs and citizen and state involvement. As suggested 
above, a statute-wide citizen suit provision would be a major 
statutory improvement. Unlike under other environmental laws where 
citizen suits are virtually always a threat to industry, citizen suits 
could be critical to a climate cap-and-trade bill‘s success. After all, 
investors and stakeholders (other than intentional defrauders) in a 
cap-and-trade market would depend on the market‘s integrity and 
scarcity of pollution rights to protect their investments. In a market of 
this size and complexity, a multiplicity of enforcers would protect 
stakeholders‘ investments, while of course helping to weed out bad 
actors.  
In addition, the leading bills would hand out most pollution 
allowances for free at the beginning, most to existing pollution 
sources, but others to favored entities most likely due to political 
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clout, to gain votes necessary to enact climate change legislation, or 
to reward favored activities. By not auctioning allowances, initial 
market incentives to reduce pollution are undercut. Furthermore, by 
using a grandfathering strategy that largely rewards existing 
polluters, new market entrants are disadvantaged and fewer entities 
will be players. The government also does not get substantial auction 
revenues it otherwise could use to subsidize related research and 
development. The net result is to further slow incentives for 
improvement and reward large polluters. If the government instead 
auctioned allowances or gave most allowances to citizens who could 
choose where to use or sell allowances, large polluters would not be 
rewarded by the law and consumers would have greater freedom to 
make market choices. With allowance giveaways, Congress chooses 
the winners, even if they are undeserving.  
As mentioned above, distribution of most or many allowances to 
states would be better. States could then tailor their distribution 
strategies to their own diverse conditions and priorities. Some 
provisions do provide small allowance percentages to state and local 
governments but typically require use of the allowances to further 
federally specified goals. Despite the ostensible reliance on market 
dynamics in the cap-and-trade system, the federal selection of 
allowance winners ends up skewing the market toward entities, 
industries, and strategies that are believed to be worthy of support. It 
would perhaps be better, and certainly more flexible, if federalism‘s 
benefits were recognized and state and local governments had a 
larger role in allocating allowances with sensitivity to changing and 
diverse needs, prospects, and goals. Better yet would be allocations 
by auction, but such a strategy is unlikely since it would fail to buy 
off industry opponents with the wealth represented by pollution 
allowances. 
CONCLUSION 
The CAA offers many lessons. Its diverse regulatory strategies 
have created an ongoing experiment in regulatory design choice. Its 
trading-based schemes—ranging from the SIP process, to 
nonattainment permit-driven offset requirements, to the 1990 Acid 
Rain cap-and-trade regime—offer obvious lessons for potential 
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climate legislation, with its own likely use of a cap-and-trade regime. 
Other CAA provisions offer more general lessons about effective 
legislative design, among them the benefits of cooperative federalism 
structures and overlapping implementation and enforcement roles for 
federal, state, local, and citizen actors.  
Unfortunately, some of the CAA‘s less effective strategies, 
especially those relying on high-stakes notice-and-comment standard-
setting based on best available technology performance standards, are 
part of climate proposals. The CAA also contains more effective and 
dynamic permit-by-permit schemes that require the updating of 
information and benchmarking of most stringent control requirements 
or accomplishments. These permit-based adjudicatory triggers offer a 
distinctly different and arguably effective backup regulatory strategy 
but are not explicitly embraced in leading climate legislation. Due to 
the current latitude left for ongoing state climate change experiments, 
under the CAA, states might use permitting decisions as a moment to 
push progress, but current federal climate legislation does not require 
any such progress, unlike the LAER and BACT provisions in the 
CAA. 
Relatedly, the CAA‘s substantial reliance on cooperative 
federalism structures includes delegated programs, savings clauses, 
and regulatory floors, all of which have facilitated experimentation 
and allowed state climate change leadership. That state and local 
climate activism, in turn, has provided a template and served to 
catalyze support for federal climate legislation. The leading climate 
bills generally preserve state authority, but they do so with some 
poorly drafted choices likely to engender litigation over federal and 
state roles. Stronger affirmation of the ongoing value of climate-
related regulation, and perhaps giving states larger climate roles, 
especially through delegated program structures and a major role in 
distributing allowances, would help harness the dynamism and 
diversity potentially provided by states.  
In addition, federal law may prove too lax and enforcement too 
porous. If climate legislation empowers states, local governments, 
and citizens to play enforcement roles and choose more stringent 
controls, that latitude could prove critical to climate change progress. 
Faced with a formidable challenge like climate change, legislators 
should pay attention to the CAA‘s lessons and utilize strategies that 
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will prompt progress and innovation. A cap-and-trade scheme can 
foster dynamism and progress but can also lead to laxity and undercut 
innovation incentives. Legislators should hedge their regulatory bets, 
learning lessons from the CAA and retaining substantial roles for the 
states. 
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